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still in progress. Considering that Algerian intelligence has been exceptionally
successful at fighting terrorists, employing clandestine methods that are brutal
and nefarious even by regional standards, the absence of any analysis of Algeria cannot be explained.
In the end, Schattenarmeen is really a
collection of spy stories, many of them
of questionable provenance, and lacks
much overarching analysis. The stories
are entertaining and, based on this reviewer’s experiences, essentially true;
however, they are not a serious treatment of an important subject. Instead,
Dietl has added to the unfortunate
genre of terrorism books, marred by
unattributed revelations, inadequate
analysis, and overheated rhetoric. The
major role played by Middle Eastern intelligence agencies in security matters
and nearly all regional politics is poorly
understood in the West and demands
detailed analysis. This is not the book to
fill that need.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER

Naval War College

Mueller, John. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear
Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. 319pp. $27.95

John Mueller has written an extensive
body of work on national security issues, work that runs counter to the conventional wisdom. Atomic Obsession, a
broad examination of the limited role
nuclear weapons have played in history,
examines the prospects for a terrorist’s
acquisition and use of a nuclear device.
Mueller argues that the expense of these
nuclear arsenals (perhaps as high as ten
trillion dollars over the course of the
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entire Cold War, by one estimate) was
not worth it. He contends that the
memory of World War II, great-power
“contentment,” and fear of conventional escalation were enough to prevent the Cold War from going hot. He
cites historian Adam Ulam as stating
that Stalin “had great respect for the
United States’ vast economic and hence
military potential, quite apart from the
bomb.”
On the specter of proliferation, Mueller
points out that decades of predictions
of an imminent cascade of new members in the nuclear club have not been
borne out, that warnings by Herman
Kahn that Japan would “unequivocably”
have an arsenal by 1980 (and similar
predictions concerning a unified Germany) have not come to pass. Mueller
documents what he says is a sixty-year
history of nuclear alarmism, arguing
that this is the light in which we should
view current concern about proliferation.
The most engaging aspect of this important book is its section on nuclear
terrorism. Mueller, to my mind, demolishes the casually constructed conventional fears on the subject. Even rogue
regimes are highly unlikely to transfer
one of these expensive (and laboriously
acquired) weapons even to a trusted independent group, because of the potential for extreme danger to the state. AlQa‘ida, the “chief demon group” in this
regard, is trusted by no one; its “explicit
enemies group includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern
regimes.”
Mueller documents how remarkably
difficult nuclear weapons are to steal
and use. Not even all weapons designers
are familiar with modern security safeguards, such as conventional explosives
within a nuclear weapon that render the
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weapon useless if precise operating procedures are not followed. Regarding concern over terrorists building their own
bombs, it is very hard to steal fissile material, and the work of constructing a
bomb is “difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting.” A great deal of complex experimentation, experimentation
beyond the capabilities of substate
groups, would be required.
Mueller points to a raft of alarming but
mistaken predictions about the likelihood of a terrorist group using a nuclear
weapon. For example, John Negroponte,
as UN ambassador (2001–2004), suggested that there was a “high probability” that al-Qa‘ida would attempt to use
a nuclear weapon on the United States
within two years—an ominous warning
offered in 2003.
Those concerned by the threat of nuclear terrorism against the United States
are likely to find Atomic Obsession a well
argued, engagingly written, thoughtprovoking, and ultimately reassuring
work.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and
the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Random
House, 2011. 336pp. $28

“We have fought the wrong war with
the wrong strategy”—so ends Bing
West’s The Wrong War. West, a former
assistant secretary of defense and Marine officer with combat experience in
Vietnam, is an award-winning author
whose books have appeared on the New
York Times best-seller list and the Commandant of the Marine Corps’s reading
list. His latest work is an engrossing
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compilation of tactical vignettes, cataloging changes to the strategic and
operational-level approaches of two
administrations and six theater-level
commanders, over the ten-year history
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
West’s concluding view on the key to
exiting Afghanistan, though perhaps an
oversimplification of the challenge, is
nonetheless a valid consideration for a
potentially long-term military commitment in Afghanistan.
The strength of West’s work is in his
vivid descriptions of operations undertaken by coalition and special operations forces (SOF) in Kunar and
Helmand Provinces. The author’s credibility and ability to connect with war
fighters provide him intimate access to
small-unit leaders, resulting in narratives of tactical-level successes that ultimately evolved into strategic-level
failures. West also describes the complexities of the regional, tribal, and
national-level political influences in Afghanistan, the latter best illustrated by
operations in Nuristan Province forced
upon the coalition by President Hamid
Karzai. There are also numerous examples of what West describes as the “culture of entitlement,” whereby Afghan
leaders gain the benefits of coalitionprovided security and development
projects while seemingly providing—at
best—only neutrality in return. West’s
portrayals of the war fighters’ courage
and heartbreak are well supported by a
number of revealing photographs. His
method of numbering the photos for
specific reference in the text is particularly effective. Aside from some minor
editorial errors, this work is remarkably
detailed yet still easy to follow, despite
the change over time in local leadership, unit rotation, and the periodic
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